The deliberate application of a strategy can have unintended discriminative effects. It is these effects or influences on discriminative responding that we argue are the source of our automatic influences, and can be dissociated from controlled influences under appropriate circumstances. We argue that such automatic influences are often latent in the interaction between the memory structures and the strategies that participants bring to bear in many implicit learning tasks.
This way of conceptualizing of automaticity is slippery and it differs in subtle ways from Redington's (this issue) conception of the term. For this reason, we suspect that Redington's arguments will be intuitively appealing to many readers. However, we also suspect that, once analysed in more detail, many readers will agree with us that Redington's arguments are either inapplicable or wrong because they are not based on opposition logic. In this rebuttal, we hope to clarify opposition logic, its application to the dual grammar learning methodology of our experiments, and to indicate exactly where we believe Redington's arguments are problematic. We adopted our definition of "automatic" from memory research, in particular, the process dissociation literature (e.g., Jacoby, 1991 Jacoby, , 1998 . Elsewhere, we have shown that cross-talk between the recognition memory and implicit learning literatures can be fruitful (e.g., Brooks & Vokey, 1991; Higham, 1997b Higham, , 1997a Higham & Brooks, 1997; Vokey & Brooks, 1992 , and in our view, adopting this definition is another case in point. To illustrate, consider again Jacoby's (1991) Experiment 3 that we summarized in our target article. In the first phase of the experiment, participants were given a mixed list of words to read and anagrams to solve (e.g., yodrw to make dowry). Another list of words was presented aurally to participants in phase 2, and participants were administered a recognition memory test in phase 3. Recall that, in the opposition condition, participants were instructed to rate only earlier heard words as "old" and to avoid rating any words "old" that were either read or solved as anagrams in Phase 1. According to Jacoby's reasoning, if words that were either read or solved as anagrams were more likely to be called "old" than new items (the false alarm rate or baseline), then the difference must have been due to an automatic memory influence (familiarity). If the memory influence from these items was controlled (conscious recollection), then they would have received "new" judgments. Indeed, the probability that previously read words were rated "old" was higher (.37) than for new words (.22) . This difference reflects an influence on performance that was counter to participants' intentions, and because it acted counter to participants' intentions, Jacoby described it as an automatic or unconscious influence. Now suppose we had interviewed Jacoby's participants after the experiment was completed and discovered that, for each test item, they tried to imagine what the word would sound like if it had been presented aurally. If the sound of the word seemed familiar, they rated the word "old," but if it seemed unusual, they responded "new." Furthermore, suppose they reported that they applied this strategy to 100% of the test items. Clearly, in this case, the strategy was controlled: participants applied a simple rule consistently throughout the test. But that in no way suggests that the influences of memory were controlled, as evinced by the result that read words were more likely to be rated old than were new words.
A similar rationale can be applied to our experiments. After studying exemplars from both GA and GB, participants may have applied a simple strategy to all the test items to decide whether or not they were consistent with GA, GB or neither. Furthermore, it is possible that they may have been able to articulate the rule(s) that they applied, and it may even be possible that their performance is in perfect agreement with their stated strategy (e.g., all items starting with "VM" were accepted and all others were rejected and participants stated that that was the rule they were applying). From Redington's perspective, this behaviour is completely controlled, and he is right, in the sense of strategic control. However, just as with Jacoby's (1991) experiment, regardless of how controlled the application of a particular strategy might have been, it is still possible that the controlled application of a strategy will produce unintended or automatic effects.
Redington describes several thought experiments that he believes undermine our conclusions. In the first of these, Redington proposed that participants trained only with GB items will incorrectly accept more GA items than NG items in the opposition condition. We would make the claim, based on these data, that an automatic effect was obtained. However, we would not claim that this automatic effect resulted from having learned about GA -exemplars of which were not even shown to participants in training. Our claim of automaticity is solely reliant on obtaining a residual difference between the acceptance of GA items and NG items when it is unintended (i.e., in the opposition condition). Exactly how this effect comes about is not important for this claim; it could result from the misapplication of knowledge about GA, GB, or both, if two grammars are used in training; it could also result from the misapplication of knowledge about GB to GA items in an experiment where only GB items were studied at training (Redington's example), or from the application of knowledge about nongrammaticality in either a single or dual grammar study. Indeed, the chunk analysis presented in the General Discussion of our target article suggests that a large portion of the automatic effect obtained in Experiment 1 resulted from the application of knowledge regarding nongrammaticality, causing NG items to be rejected at a greater rate than GA items. Thus, just as with the read words/new words difference revealed in the opposition condition of Jacoby's experiment, the exact nature of the contribution to the GAopp/NGopp difference and the strategy participants used when they classified items in a way that produced the effect are not important; the simple fact is, participants cannot have been in control of whatever influence caused them to accept GA items more than NG items; otherwise they would have discounted it and not produced the effect.
Redington also discusses a thought experiment involving sets of GA and GB items that are subjectively ambiguous as to particular grammatical category membership. For these ambiguous items, participants are assumed to guess specific grammar membership, responding GA and GB equally often. The first problem with his example is that it fails to predict our results! One source of evidence that we advanced to support the notion that the controlled and automatic influences we obtained in our experiments were separable was the fact that response deadline (Experiment 1) and retention interval (Experiment 2) affected these influences differently. In particular, our controlled effect was decreased by these manipulations, but our automatic effect remained invariant. In contrast, Redington's thought experiment using ambiguous items predicts that any decrease in the controlled effect will be associated with an increase of the automatic effect of exactly the same size. To see why this must be the case, consider the details of Redington's example. He argued that under standard testing conditions, the knowledge that participants had derived from training would allow them to be sure about the category membership of 50% of both the GA and GB items so that they would be correctly categorized 100% of the time. However, the other 50% of GA and GB items would be rendered ambiguous with regard to the particular grammatical category, leading participants to guess either GA or GB equally often for these items. These parameters mean that 100% of the GA items would be classified as grammatical in the in concert condition (50% sure GA plus 25% guess GA plus 25% guess GB, all of which would lead to "grammatical" responses). In the opposition condition, 25% of the GA items would be classified as grammatical (only 25% guess GB would lead to "grammatical" responses). Finally, because of their distinctiveness, 0% of the NG items would be classified as grammatical in both the in concert or opposition conditions. This pattern renders a controlled effect of 75% and an automatic effect of 25%. Redington argues further that the size of the set of GA and GB ambiguous items would increase in the deadline condition. However, this increase does not affect GAic nor NGopp, only GAopp. To illustrate, suppose all of the GA and GB items were made ambiguous in the deadline condition. One hundred per cent of the GA items would still be rated grammatical in the in concert condition (50% guess GA plus 50% guess GB, leading to 100% "grammatical" responses) and 0% of the NG items would be rated "grammatical" because the ambiguity pertains to the GA/GB distinction, not the grammatical/nongrammatical distinction. However, the proportion of GA items assigned "grammatical" responses in the opposition condition would increase from 25% to 50% (50% guess GB). In short, regardless of the size of ambiguous set, GAic and NGopp are pinned at 100% and 0%, respectively. These fixed values mean that the increase in GAopp caused by increasing the ambiguous set, which reduces the controlled effect from 75% to 50%, would also cause an increase in the automatic effect from 25% to 50%. Clearly, a perfect trade-off relationship between the controlled and automatic effect sizes is not what we found with either response deadline (Experiment 1) or retention interval (Experiment 2). Simply stated, Redington's example in no way is able to account for our results.
However, even if our pattern had been obtained (and it is conceivable that it could be with some added assumptions that maintain the spirit of Redington's example), there are still problems with the underlying rationale. Consider again the automatic effect, the bone of greatest contention. As noted above, Redington's example using ambiguous item sets would likely produce the GAopp>NGopp pattern that is evidence of an automatic effect. At first glance, the automatic effect doesn't seem automatic at all; participants applied a simple rule consistently to all the test item and their classification performance can be perfectly predicted from this rule. Again, however, it is not the consistency or control with which participants apply a given strategy that is important here, but rather the results of the application of that strategy.
Redington also discussed a source-tag model that he claims can account for our results. According to this model, response deadline and delay may serve to make source tags attached to knowledge of training items less readable, but a subset of knowledge remains in the knowledge store that allows for some item discrimination. According to Redington, such a model might show evidence for two dissociable forms of knowledge: the source tags support controlled effects whereas the source-nonspecific residual knowledge supports the automatic effect.
1 It is clear that Redington believes that a source-tag model provides evidence of automaticity, whereas the strategies underlying performance in his thought experiments do not. What is the difference? If automaticity is defined in terms of the degree of control over an intended strategy (which is presumably Redington's definition), then there is a big difference. Because the source tags have deteriorated and are unreadable, participants cannot fully control the application of source knowledge even though they intend to, a problem that is absent with the strategies outlined in Redington's other thought experiments. But, again, this confuses "automatic" as a description of failing to control a strategy (as in the source tag model) and "automatic" as a description of an influence on performance. From our perspective, there is no important difference between the source tag model and the others Redington presents because we have defined automaticity in the latter sense-that is, in terms of the net result of a strategy, not in terms of the strategy itself.
Dissociation versus Opposition Logic
Redington suggests that our definition of automatic or unconscious influences ignores the evidence from verbal report, and as a result, it does not capture the important aspects of implicit learning. We agree that opposition logic ignores verbal report-in fact, that is the point! As far as we are concerned, if 40 years of research on implicit learning has still not convinced sceptics of its existence, as the most recent round of controversy surrounding this issue suggests (see Dienes & Berry, 1997a , 1997b Neal & Hesketh, 1997a , 1997b Perruchet, Vinter, & Gallego, 1997; Reber, 1997; Stadler, 1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1997) , then it is time for a change. On the one hand, Redington declares that such controversy has meant that "we now possess a much more advanced notion of various senses of the concept of 'conscious awareness,' and experimental criteria for its presence or absence" (p. Xx). But on the other hand, he states "indeed, I strongly concur with Shanks and St. John (1994) , that the evidence for lack of awareness in implicit learning is questionable" (p. xx). We're not sure what has advanced here if we can't even reach consensus about the nature of implicit learning itself! This is exactly the problem: how can any scientific progress be made with dissociation logic if every time a researcher uses it to investigate the underlying mechanisms and processes of implicit learning, a tangential debate ensues about whether the learning is truly inaccessible to consciousness?
Our point in the target article, though, was not to provide a definition of "implicit learning" or even "implicit knowledge"; others are carefully picking their way through that minefield (e.g., Dennett, 1982; Dienes & Perner, 1996, in press ). Rather, we wanted to prove a method for its investigation. It seems to us reasonable that a knowledge source of influence that results in unintended discriminations and distinctions will be considered "implicit" by any definition that emerges after the dust of this extensive debate has settled. Such sources are probably not exhaustive of all that is or will be thought properly to be "implicit", and special methods may have to be developed to investigate these other possible forms of implicit knowledge, including possibly those methods that do not ignore the evidence from verbal report. However, the theoretical possibility of forms of implicit knowledge not directly tied to uncontrollable influences does not invalidate the investigation of these uncontrollable or automatic influences as examples of implicit knowledge or learning.
In the Discussion section of our paper, we provided evidence that at least some of the automatic influence on our participants' grammatical decisions was in the form of a test-cued detection of novelty-what we referred to as "latent" knowledge: as extreme examples, we suggested that items such as "MADONNA", "XXXXX" or "RCMP" would have been confidently rejected had they been presented at test because they embody salient properties that none of the grammatical study items (from either grammar) had. Somewhat less extreme, because of the constraints imposed by the grammar, the GA test set would tend to contain fewer of these noticeably novel items than would the NG test set. Relying even in part on this detection of novelty during the exclusion task would provide an inadvertent discrimination between GA and NG items. This result would happen not, as Redington would have it, because GA items are more similar to GB items than are NG items, but because GA test items are more alike GA study items than NG items are. NG items, by definition, have no corresponding study items. 2 This similarity relation is the knowledge of the GA grammar that as an influence on our participants' behaviour we are claiming is automatic or implicit. It is not even necessary that participants become aware of the specific basis for the novelty of the these test items (e.g., "there were no common acronyms among the study items") for the effect to occur; simple familiarity processes ("hmmm, there is something odd or not quite right about that item") would work as well, much as Reber argued originally for these tasks.
Redington takes us to task for our use of "latent knowledge". He writes that "(i)f everything that a participant can infer, given their current knowledge, including, for example, that 56 x 4 = 224, is unconscious in the sense of being latent, then it would seem to be so broad a class of knowledge as to be meaningless" (p. xx). We disagree. We don't mean latent in the sense that Redington uses it here. Indeed, Redington uses the term as synonymous with "implicit"-in the natural language sense of implied by what is represented explicitly (see, e.g., Dennett, 1982; Dienes & Perner, 1996, in press ). Our use of the term is meant to contrast with that sense of implicit (Vokey & Higham, in press) , and is consonant with Dennett's (1982) use of the related term of "tacit knowledge". Tacit or latent knowledge in this sense refers to knowledge that is dispositional : knowledge that allows or provides for the appropriate responses to inputs without being either directly represented explicitly or an implication of explicit knowledge. Dennett (1982) provides the example of a hand-held calculator. The knowledge that allows it to respond correctly to such inputs as 56 x 4 (and thereby rendering that fact "explicit") is not an explicit list of arithmetic facts or mathematical propositions of which 56 x 4 = 224 is an implication. Rather, the machine is so constructed as to have the answering of arithmetical questions correctly as a dispositional property-an automatic consequence of its workings.
We are making the same argument for the "implicit" knowledge our participants acquired in our experiments. We were intentionally vague about the precise character of the knowledge our participants acquired that provided for these automatic effects, as our principal point was simply to demonstrate such effects. One possibility we favour, however, is the simple memory for the individual study items, as originally suggested by Brooks (1978) to account for Reber's (1967 Reber's ( , 1969 Reber's ( , 1976 early claims for implicit abstraction of structure in artificial grammar learning. The grammatical structure is distributed over the participants' memory for the study items, and, hence, is latent within it. Nowhere within this memory for individual instances is it represented either explicitly or implicitly that "XXXXXX", for example, is a poor example of a grammatical item. But its relative unfamiliarity or novelty when compared with the study items-an automatic consequence, we would argue, of processing the item in the context of this task-would mark it as a likely NG item. Similarly, encountering a test item that was strongly (and automatically in the context of the task) suggestive of a particular study item from Grammar B could be interpreted as good evidence that the test item was indeed a GB item. Again, though, the grammaticality of this item is neither explicitly or implicitly represented in the memory for the individual study items, but rather is latent in how this memory influences the processing of individual test items.
This decade, common conceptions of consciousness have undergone substantial beating in both philosophy and psychology. For example, Dennett (1991) popularized the "multiple drafts" model of consciousness in his book Consciousness Explained. He advanced this model as an alternative to the highly intuitive, but untenable, notion of the Cartesian theatre. Similarly, opposition logic, and the development of the process dissociation procedure in psychology (Jacoby, 1991) , has provided a refreshing alternative to the traditional reliance on verbal report as the ultimate basis for the discrimination of implicit from explicit memory. In our view, these changes should be embraced, because they broaden the way that we conceive of an old problem. This need is particularly true for research on implicit learning. We have gone beyond "healthy scepticism" in this field; we are at the stage where the same debates are becoming stale and repetitious. Our hope is that our research will make a modest contribution to a new way of thinking about unconscious learning which, in the long run, will be more productive than what dissociation logic has proven to be.
